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Introduction
The relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
developing countries has tended to be volatile and frequently acrimonious
Recent writings document the controversy, breakdown, and reestablishment
of relationship between the IMP and deficit countries such as Brazil,
Indonesia, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Peru and Zaire to name just a few (McCauley
(3), Payer (4) and Stallings (5». In each case, loan conditionality
has been the core of the dispute.
Jamaica is the latest in the series of problem cases. Twice
within the past three years, the Jamaican political leadership has broken
off negotiations with the IMF on the grounds that its conditions for
balance of payments support are unnecessarily harsh and socially
unacceptable. On the first occasion (January 1977), the crux of the
dispute was the deflationary effects of the exchange rate devaluation
proposed by the Fund. In April 1977, after unsuccessfully pursuing
alternative financing among countries in both the socialist and capitalist
worlds, the Jamaican government reversed its position and accepted a standby
loan from the IMF. The second episode results from the failure of the
economy to satisfy some criteria embodied in an Extended Fund Facility
loan agreement made in May 1978. Renegotiation of the program broke
down over the IMF's requests for sizable reductions in deficit financed
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expenditures. The Jamaican government once more announced its intention
to attempt alternative solutions to its balance of payments problem.
Presumably, it is again seeking credit from the socialist bloc. An
important new development may be unilateral rescheduling of the country's
foreign debt which extensive foreign exchange rationing has caused to
be seriously in arrears.
Several important questions arise from this series of events. How
adequate and reasonable is the IMF stabilization program? How feasible
are the alternative adjustment policies? What are the implications for
Jamaica's international relationships? This paper deals with the first
issue, the significance of which is indicated by the fact that large
segments of Jamaican society endorse their government's opinion of the
IMP stabilization program. Moreover t the constancy of this view in
widely varying LOC settings underscores its salience for IMF-LDC
relationship. A case study of the Jamaican experience can serve a
useful purpose by elucidating this issue and by so doing aid better
program design and sober consideration by the parties involved. The
particular stabilization program examined is the 1978 Extended Fund
Facility loan agreement. My approach is to first describe and analyze
the balance of payments crisis. Next t the stabilization program is
outlined and assessed in terms of its adequacy and adjustment costs.
The Severity of the Payments Crisis
Jamaica is a small Caribbean island economy. It is eleven thousand
square kilometers large, with a population of 2.2 million persons. Its
per capita income in 1970 was J$600 <U.S. $720). The economy is
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dependent on the rest of the world for its supply of goods and, to a
lesser degree, finance. Foreign trade constituted 74 percent of GNP in
1970. Exports comprised 35 percent and imports 39 percent. Net foreign
borrowing amounted to 30 percent of national savings. The unemployment
rate is between 20 to 23 percent according to official estimates. Until
the 19708, domestic price inflation was mild, not exceeding 3 percent
per annum up to 1967, then rising to 6 percent in 1969. Real per capita
national income grew at an average annual rate of 4 percent between
1965 and 1970. Table 1, column 3 shows that small balance of payments
surpluses were consistently achieved. However, during the 19708, all
that changed. The economy went into prolonged recession. Real per
capita national income declined in each year of that decade, at an
average annual rate of 3 percent. Annual inflation rates rose rapidly
from 9 percent in 1972 to an average of 22 percent between 1974 and
1975 and after decelerating to 10 percent during the next two years,
accelerated to 48 percent in 1978. Open unemployment grew from 18
percent of the labor force in 1970 to 24 percent in 1977.
Several indicators reveal the magnitude of the international
payments problem in the 1970s (Table 1). The overall balance of payments,
measured by changes in official reserves, moved from a surplus of
J$36 million in 1971 to a deficit of J$44 million 1972. Deficits
persisted thereafter, reaching the alarming level of J$238 million
in 1976. The current account deficit widened from J$145 million in
1970 to J$275 million in 1976. Private net capital inflows, which
historically performed an equilibrating role, became increasingly
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Table 1. Jamaican Trade and Payments Performance (3$ million)
Merchandise Current Overall
Trade Account Payments
Balance Balance Balance
1965 - 27 - 22 10
1966
-
6 - 30 17
1967 - 18 - 51 14
1968 - 68 - 86 28
1969 - 74 -103 -11
1970
- 89 -145 18
1971 -109 - 93 36
1972 -121 -117 - 44
1973 -161 -164 - 28
1974 -107
-152 54
1975 -145 -257 - 74
1976 -120
-275 -238
1977 85
- 31 - 15
1978 47
- 60 - 70
Note: Minus sign indicates a deficit.
SOURCE: Bank of Jamaica, The Balance of Payments of Jamaica, various
years.
-5-
inadequate after 1970, and practically ceased by 1976. For a while,
government foreign borrowing helped to offset the decline in private
capital inflows, but in 1977 government debt payments exceeded new
debt inflows by J$5 million. As a consequence of these trends, the
economy rapidly lost international reserves. Net foreign assets of
the central bank amounted to J$137 million in 1970, contracted somewhat
during the next two years, recovered to $141 million in 1974, and then
fell sharply and continuously. By December 1977, net foreign reserves
were minus J$171 million. The large negative foreign reserve balance
is the net outcome of a reduction of gross foreign reserves from J$168
million in 1974 to J$43 million in 1977, and a growth of gross foreign
liabilities from zero in December 1972 to J$2l4 million in December 1977.
Indisputably, therefore, by the end of 1976 the Jamaican economy had
a balance of payments problem of immense proportions.
The Causes of the Payments Crisis
Jamaican po1icymakers emphasize external influences on the balance
of payments, namely energy price increases, adverse terms of trade, the
slackening of capital inflows, and the investment income remittances.
Domestic inflation was attributed to external causes and was regarded
as an effect of the payments disequilibria. Corrective policies
independently adopted prior to 1978 were conscious attempts to
adjust the economic behavior of resident households and corporations
to the perceived adverse external situation. The set of measures,
differing in scope and severity of application, included quantitative
restrictions on credit to the private sector, wage and price guidelines,
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and exchange controls on imports and capital transactions. While partially
correct, the official diagnosis is seriously deficient in its neglect of
domestic production and supply problems and the economic destabilizing
influence of government transactions. It will be argued that the
Jamaican balance of payments crisis was not so much the outcome of
external forces as of serious problems of domestic economic management.
While important, the behavior of external prices and capital flows
were not central causes of the balance of payments crisis. The export
price index in domestic currency rose less rapidly than the import
price index (Table 2, Columns 2 and 3). As a consequence. the net
barter terms of trade tended to deteriorate during the 1970s, though
never becoming significantly nor persistently adverse. It is also
incorrect to attribute the balance of payments problem primarily to
energy prices. The first major deficit occurred in 1972, two years
prior to the OPEC oil price increases. The first upsurge of import
prices coincided with the 1973 exchange rate devaluation. More
accurately, energy prices aggravated the deficit by increasing the
costs of fuel imports and by causing inflation among Jamaica's main
import suppliers.
Outflows of investment income were not an important cause of the
deficit. Outflows of investment income averaged J$55 million in current
prices (J$42 million in constant prices) between 1970 and 1974, compared
with J$59 million in current prices (J$67 million in constant prices)
between 1965 and 1969 (Table 3~ column 1). The sizable outflows (in
nominal terms) which did occur between 1975 and 1978 were service payments
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Table 2. Indices of Jamaican Dollar Prices of Imports and Exports,
and Net Barter Terms of Trade (1974 = 100)
Net Barter
Import Export Terms of
Year Prices Prices Trade
1965 35 32 92
1966 36 40 111
1967 37 42 113
1968 43 45 106
1969 43 46 107
1970 44 52 117
1971 53 51 96
1972 52 53 101
1973 69 57 83
1974 100 100 100
1975 112 131 117
1976 118 128 108
1977 152 133 88
1978 219 212 97
SOURCE: Jamaica Deparament of Statistics Statistical Abstract, various
years.
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on debts incurred by the government to finance the fiscal and inter-
national payments deficit. Gross outflows of portfolio income were
as little as 3$12 million in 1972. Large government Eurocurrency debts
were incurred after 1973, as a consequence of which outflows of
portfolio income rose to J$70 million in 1976 and $120 million in 1978.
Foreign capital inflows practically ceased after 1975. Foreign direct
investment, which offset the current account deficit until 1971,
declined drastically beginning in 1972, and became negative after
1975 (Table 3, column 3). The growth in official foreign debt between
1973 and 1976 obscured this trend (Table 3, columns 4 and 5), Altogether,
total Det inflows of foreign capital contracted from J$ 134 million in 1970
to J$60 million in 1972, recovered to a peak of J$221 million in 1974,
before declining rapidly thereafter (Table 3, column 3). To make
matters worse, import price inflation eroded the foreign exchange
value of these inflows. Net capital inflows (deflated by the import
price index) declined from J$134 million in 1970 to J$5l million in
1972, rose to $98 million in 1974, and then fell to $15 million in
1977. On the basis of these trends, it must be concluded that capital
outflows are not the cause of the payments imbalance. On the contrary,
gross inflows were simply no longer sufficient to finance the current
account deficit.
Close examination of the merchandise trade and service accounts
reveals that serious problems lie on the supply side and in the
performance of the economy. The payments crisis may be attributed to
the rather more fundamental problems of deteriorating productive capacity
and performance, rapid bureaucratic growth, domestic credit expansion,
and inflation.
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Table 3. Capital Flows in the Jamaican Balance of Payments (Millions
of Current Jamaican Dollars)
Other
Investment Net Capital Direct Private Oovt ,
Year Income Inflows Investment Capital* Capital
1965 - 31 12 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1966 - 65 47 n..a, n.a. n.a.
1967 - 67 65 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1968 - 61 114 101 0 12
1969 -72 92 85 0 10
1970 - 82 134 134 3 1
1971 - 38 112 146 8 4
1972 - 43 60 21 11 19
1973 - 53 125 20 69 33
1974 - 61 221 21 102 82
1975 - 93 190 2 73 112
1976 -105 41 1 10 72
1977 -126 52 6 4 5
1978 -169 9 - 24 -161 163
Notes: * Primarily government-guaranteed debt of public enterprises.
SOURCE: Bank of Jamaica~ The Balance of Payments of Jamaica, various
years.
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The merchandise trade deficit stems mainly from poor export
performance. Merchandise exports (in 1970 prices) after growing slowly
between 1967 and 1974, declined sharply from J$327 million in 1974 to
J$243 million in 1976 and still further to J$178 million in 1978.
Quantitative restrictions caused merchandise imports to contract even
more severely. Imports, having grown rapidly from J$259 million in
1967 to a peak of J$374 million in 1970, declined consistently to
3$138 million in 1978. Nonetheless, these import restrictions, though
applied with increasing stringency, could not compensate for the
deterioration in export trade.
The export performance reflects production shortfalls. The data
in Table 4 show that production of the major exports decreased. The
indices of physical production for bauxite and alumina, which comprised
65 percent of total exports in 1970, fell from 125 in 1974 to 97 in
1978 for bauxite and from 167 to 125 for alumina. The production decline
in the sugar industry is even more striking. Sugar is the second
largest commodity export, comprising 11 percent of total exports in
1970. The index of physical production declined continuously from 135
in 1966 to 100 in 1970 and 77 in 1978. The output index for bananas,
which comprised 4 percent of total exports, declined in similar fashion.
Stagnation characterizes the production history of the other agricultural
exports such as coffee, cocoa, pimento, and ginger. Exports of manu-
factured goods (excluding sugar) account for 8 percent of total merchandise
exports. Although no composite indices for manufacturing production
are available, it seems that production did not decline until import
restrictions reduced the supply of vital imported inputs.
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Table 4. Indices of Physical Production (1970 = 100)
Year Bauxite Alumina Sugar Bananas Coffee Cocoa
1965 140 44 132 112 81 152
1966 75 46 135 124 66 103
1967 76 49 121 141 68 41
1968 70 54 120 114 75 98
1969 88 68 103 112 56 97
1970 100 100 100 100 100 100
1971 104 109 102 94 98 87
1972 107 121 101 95 82 135
1973 111 146 88 80 56 27
1974 125 167 99 53 17 78
1975 92 131 96 52 27 97
1976 86 95 98 59 4 94
1977 94 119 78 60 125 108
1978 97 125 77 58 72 155
SOURCE: Computed on basis of data in Bank of Jamaica Balance of
Payments of Jamaica~ various years.
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Productivity also declined in the export agricultural industries.
The index of cane harvested per acre (a measure of agricultural produc-
tivity) £e11 continuously from 100 in 1970 to 84 in 1975. and though
recovering subsequently still remained below the 1970 level. The index
of the cane-to-sugar conversion ratio (a measure of sugar manufacturing
productivity) declined from 100 in 1970 to 87 in 1975, recovering
slightly thereafter.
The problem with respect to exports of services lay on the demand
side. Tourism, the main source of net foreign travel receipts, was a
major growth industry until 1973, contributing 18 percent of total
foreign exchange earnings and employing 1.5 percent of the labor force
in 1970. Net travel receipts comprised 18 percent of total exports in
1970, Foreign travel receipts decreased drastically from a level of
J$80 million (in constant prices) in 1973 to J$l7 million in 1976.
This contraction, unlike that of merchandise exports, was due to a fall
in demand. The number of foreign visitors to Jamaica decreased by
nearly a third between 1974 and 1977. Several factors explain the
downswing in tourism. Among these are the economic recession in the
U.S.A., the origin of 76 to 80 percent of tourists to Jamaica. Compared
to meaD. annual growth rates of roughly 5 percent between 1965 and 1975,
U.s. real per capita GNP grew at only D,S percent between 1975 and 1977,
Since income elasticities of demand range between 1.1 and 1.5 (Bond
and Ladman (1), and Ffrench (2) ), this trend in U,S. income growth partly
explains the sudden and pronounced decrease in U.S. visitors to Jamaica.
Further, the rapid domestic inflation, combihed with a negative price
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elasticity of tourist expenditures between 2.6 and 3.8 (Ffrench, 2)
also reduced Jamaican receipts from tourism. Other pertinent factors
are some local ambivalence and hostility towards tourism and the
increasingly unstable soeio-political climate.
Output declines in the mining industry were essentially due to
falling demand caused by the U.S. economic recession and in part
represented a power play by the bauxite companies to force a reversal
of higher tax rates imposed by the Jamaican government in 1974. For
the remaining export production sectors, output and productivity
decreases are linked to the failure of the economy to recapitalize and
to expand its capital stock sufficiently. Real net capital formation
contracted from J$250 million in 1970 to J$158 million in 1974 and
still further to J$85 in 1976. Net capital formation was a paltry
J$29 million in 1977. Aggregate domestic savings decreased significantly.
Domestic savings which averaged 17 percent of GNP between 1965 and
1970, averaged only 10 percent between 1971 and 1975, and became
negative (-0.4 percent) between 1976 and 1977. The government's
propensity to consume increased. Public consumption expenditures
averaged 75 percent of tax revenue between 1971 and 1976, compared with
63 percent between 1965 and 1970. Personal savings became increasingly
negative from as early as 1971. Corporate savings and a rise in the
average corporate savings propensity from 46 percent (1965-70) to
57 percent (1971-75) moderated the overall decline in domestic savings
until 1976 when corporate savings contracted substantially. Foreign
direct investment also helped to boost real national savings in the
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first three years of the decade. In contrast, a large proportion of
portfolio debt was allocated to public consumption.
While it is tempting to attempt to explain the recent investment
performance in terms of a capital strike by foreign and local firms in
response to the democratic socialist posture of the Jamaican government,
more plausible economic reasons can be identified. Rising input costs
in the face of domestic price rigidities reduced the level and stability
of profits and adversely affected profit expectations. Wage increases
ranged from 18 to 45 percent, compared to average annual rate of consumer
price inflation between 6 and 27 percent. Commodity price controls
became more extensive. Though applications for price increases were
frequently approved, the fact that approvals were not always for the
full amount sought, that applications were sometimes denied, and the lag
between application and approval negatively affected profits levels
and profits expectations. Real gross profits remained stable between
1970 and 1973, averaging J$370 million (31 percent of GNP). Gross
profits then rose to J$41l million in 1974 (34 percent GNP) and fell
thereafter to an average of J$334 million (30 percent of GNP) between
1975 and 1977. Since the propensity to save profits exceeds the
propensity to save labor incomes, these adverse shifts in the absolute
level of profits and in its share of national income resulted in lower
levels of domestic resource accumulation.
The profits depression in the export sector was not caused by
any significant fall in export prices. Export prices were not generally
depressed (Table 5). On the contrary, export prices in local currency
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Table 5. Price Relatives of Jamaican Exports (1970 = 100)
Year Bauxite Alumina Sugar Bananas Coffee Cocoa
1965 53 75 76 69 59 62
1966 100 76 84 72 59 64
1967 100 79 88 78 66 88
1968 100 91 91 102 84 92
1969 100 94 98 94 89 92
1970 100 100 100 100 100 100
1971 100 92 103 106 118 96
1972 97 88 126 106 139 96
1973 109 101 140 172 170 148
1974 162 193 284 180 252 184
1975 198 230 568 244 241 180
1976 281 269 250 176 325 184
1977 233 266 329 253 498 268
SOURCE: Computed on basis of data in Bank of Jamaica Balance of
Payments of Jamaica, several years; and Owen Jefferson
Post War Economic Development of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica,
Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of
West Indies, 1972.
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tended to rise. Price depressions, when they occurred (e.g. sugar in
1976, bananas in 1975), were shortlived. It is possible that gains
in export prices were not transferred to producers by the quasi-
governmental export marketing boards, but present data constraints
do not permit examination of this possibility.
Domestic price inflation was an important influence on the balance
of payments. Inflation generated increases in labor and other input
costs. It also reduced the real value of profits. Furthermore,
inflation by increasing nominal expenditures raised imports. Two basic
factors contributed to Jamaica's inflation: import prices and domestic
credit. Import prices rose at an average annual rate of 25 percent
between 1970 and 1977, compared to 6 percent between 1965 and 1970.
Imported inflationary pressures reinforced those attributable to monetary
and credit expansion. Total domestic credit of the monetary sector
expanded from J$277 million (25 percent of GNP) in nominal terms in
1970 to J$129l million (49 percent of GNP) in 1977. In real terms,
the growth of credit outstripped that of real resource availability by
a wide margin, thereby contributing to price inflation.
Government behavior occupies a central place in Jamaica's balance
of payments experience. A variety of subsidies and credit programs
to expand exports proved ineffective in the prevailing situation of
inadequate product prices, high costs of production, input supply problems,
and credit supply rigidities. Simultaneously, much of the inflationary
expansion of domestic credit was due to mounting budgetary deficits
financed by the banking system. The deficit (in real terms) increased
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from J$41 million (4 percent of GNP) in 1970 to J$187 million (17
percent of GNP) in 1976. Nominal central bank direct credit to the
central government mushroomed from J$4 million in 1971 to J$402 million
in 1977. If one adds indirect credit in the form of overdrawn
deposit accounts, the estimates of central bank financing would be
considerably larger, for example by J$100 million in 1975. Commercial
banks lending to the government increased rapidly as well, from J$44
million (11 percent of bank assets) in 1970 to J$248 million (33 percent
of bank assets) in 1977. Apart from causing inflation, this massive
expansion of government debt displaced private sector debt, including
that of productive enterprises. Government debt as a percentage of
total debt rose from 11 percent in 1970 to 50 percent in 1977. Further~
more, the average ratio of taxes to GNP increased from .17 in 1970 to
.28 in 1977. Through its credit and fiscal operations, the Jamaican
government succeeded in bidding away real resources on an increasing
scale. Government share of the labor force rose, particularly during
the latter half of the 1970s from 11 percent in 1974 to 15 percent in
1977. Its share of labor remuneration increased even faster from 16
percent in 1970 to 27 percent in 1977. The share of government in total
consumption expenditures rose from 17 percent in 1970 to 24 percent in
1977. No data is available on its share in total imports. However,
the exemption of government transactions from the stringent import
restrictions implies that government's share became larger. In effect,
the government facilitated its own requirements by crowding out the
import demands of the private sector.
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To some extent, this increasing command over real resources
resulted from government take-over of enterprises which either ceased
or were about to cease operations. The objective in such cases was to
avert greater unemployment. These take-overs were sometimes to protect
government's financial interests in cases where government owned equity
or had guaranteed bank loans to the enterprises. In a few instances,
the expansion of government was in fulfillment of the policy of increasing
government's share of productive activity. In all three situations,
government activities simply replaced private productive activity.
However, much of government expenditures were of a consumption nature.
The national income data reveal that government consumption expenditures
increased at an annual average rate of 13 percent between 1970 and 1977.
Income redistribution and short-term employment objectives rather than
production objectives dominated government expenditure programs. Thus
basically nonproductive program~ such as the Special Employment Program
introduced in 1972 as a temporary form of unemployment relie~ grew
throughout the decade. As another example, educational expenditure
programs, e.g. Free Secondary Education, while having a longrun investment
component were conceived essentially as redistributive measures. 2 The
trends in government consumption and the social welfare nature of many
of the public programs indicate that the main effect of governmental
growth was the substitution of public consumption and less productive
public expenditures for more productive private expenditures. Bureau-
cratic growth, through its resource allocative effect, further undermined
the productive capacity and performance of the economy, and thereby its
balance of payments performance.
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The central conclusion to he drawn so far is that the Jamaican
balance of payments crisis 1s largely attributable to the poor export
and production performance of the economy, domestic credit expansion,
inflation, and excessive growth of governmental services. As such,
effective corrective policies must be directed to these fundamental
areas of public economic management. Accordingly, the IMF stablization
program is assessed in terms of this diagnosis and in terms of the
adjustment costs it imposes on the society.
The IMF Stablization Program
The Standby Agreement of 1977 was a forerunner to the Extended
Fund Facility agreed upon in 1978. The former embodied the Jamaican
decision to adopt a dual exchange rate system, under which government
foreign transactions, imports of some foods and medicines, and the
foreign transactions of the bauxite industry were to be based on the
previously existing exchange rate. All other transactions were to be
based on a new rate, representing a 37.5 percent devaluation of the
currency. The agreement also required the government to reduce its
fiscal deficit and its reliance on central bank credit. The Standby
Agreement was a compromise agreement which does not fully convey the
IMP position about the causes of ardsolutions to the Jamaican balance
of payments problem. In contrast, the Extended Fund Facility agreement,
which Jamaica signed at a time of dire need, fully reflects the IMF's
views. For this reason, the following appraisal is limited to the
Extended Fund Facility.
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The stabilization program planned for a fall in public and private
consumption expenditures. and an increase in fixed investment expendi-
tures as a percentage of GDP.3 Gross investment was projected to increase
from 10.4 percent to 21.8 percent of GDP over the 3-year program period,
and government capital expenditure from 12.1 percent to 12.8 percent.
The increased investment expenditure was to be financed not by credit
creation but by appropriate increases in the government and private
sectors savings ratios. Government revenue was planned to increase
from 22.5 percent of GDP to 28.1 percent, and government current
expenditure to decline from 23.7 percent to 20.2 percent. Correspondingly,
it was intended that the budget deficit would decrease from 13.4
percent to 4.5 percent and government savings would increase from
minus 1.3 percent of GDP to 7.9 percent. By imposing wage guidelines
which limited increases in gross labor remuneration to 15 percent per
annum over a two year per1od~ and by decontrolling prices, the program
sought to increase the level and the share of profits, thereby augmenting
domestic financing capacity. In addition, the removal of subsidies from
goods and services produced by public enterprises and corresponding
increases in their prices were intended to reduce public consumption
and improve the profitability of public enterprises. Altogether,
the program planned for an increase in domestic financing of investment
as a proportion of GDP from 7.6 percent in 1978 to 19.4 percent in
1981. Greater dependence on foreign financing of gross accumulation
was not envisaged.
The agreement stipulated the immediate unification of the exchange
rate, and a devaluation of 15 percent~ followed by a phased
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one totalling an additional 15 percent over twelve months. Restrictions
on payments and imports were to be gradually removed during the program
period. Arrears on foreign debt payments were to be quickly reduced.
Specifically, arrears were to be decreased from U.S. $82 million in
March 1978 to U.S. $20 million by March 1979.
The IMF agreed to provide U.S. $240 million in loan funds over the
three year life of the program. It was also projected that the economy
would, with the help of the IMF, obtain new private foreign credits,
would be able to refinance its short and medium term debts. and would
attract new direct foreign investment. However, the stabilization
program in order to restrain the growth of already troublesome debt
service payments imposed ceilings of U.S. ~OO million and U.S. $20
million on short and medium term debts incurred during the first year
of the program.
The analytical framework which underlies the IMF stablization
program is implicit in those stipulations pertaining to the expenditure
mix, factor incomes, credit and the exchange rate. The higher rate of
investment financed by increased domestic savings and stimulated by more
bouyant profit conditions would lead in this scheme of things to a
higher rate of growth and thus to an improvement in the balance of
payments. The curbs on the growth of credit in conjunction with the
investment program was intended to reduce the growth rate of inflation.
Further, devaluation combined with restrictive monetary policy reduces
real money balances and possibly as a consequence import expenditures.
It was envisaged that exchange rate adjustment would influence export
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demand via relative prices and the supply of exports and import
substitutes via increased profitability of both home goods and export
industries. Clearly, the IMP diagnosed the Jamaica balance of payments
problem in terms of lagging economic performance and demand imbalances
critically linked to the government sector. In terms of the analysis in
this paper, its diagnoses in these respects are essentially correct.
The central remaining issue is the empirical validity of the implicit
production and growth model, particularly the investment and output
supply relationships. Since a stabilization program, by virtue of its
differential incidence on various classes and economic groups, is an
exercise in political economy, the length and form of the adjustment
process assumes critical importance.
It is difficult in the absence of detailed quantitative analysis
to be categorical about the likely effects of the stabilization program~
especially since later events indicate that important departures from
the program were made with respect to public sector wage increases and
credit. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be advanced with varying
degrees of firmness.
Devaluation is not likely to have a significant depressing effect
on Jamaican import demand during this period. This is partly due to
the fact that real import demand has already been reduced to the
essential minimum, and even below that judging from the lower levels
of production caused by import rationing. Given the country's import
dependence, the further round of devaluation leads to an increase in
the domestic currency value of imports. On the other bend , the exchange
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rate devaluation has the potential for inducing the supply of exports
by increasing the local currency price-cost ratio of export producers,
providing that the wage guidelines are enforced. Further, the domestic
price level inflation induced by the devaluation operates as a mechanism
for factor-income redistribution in favor of profits in import-
substituting and domestic industries, again with the proviso that the
wage guidelines are binding. Thus, one important potential strength of
exchange rate devaluation and complementary wage policy is the possi-
bility of ~aising the level of profits absolutely and relative to
labor incomes. In this context, exchange rate policy is directed
towards production. As such, it depends heavily on the responsiveness
of producers to profit signals. In the context of the prevailing
political and economic uncertainty, input supply rigidities, and
capital stock deterioration, it is likely that supply response would
be slow. The speed of adjustment is unlikely to be uniform. Agricultural
supply response to price though positive,4 would be slow for well known
reasons such as crop maturation lags, establishment periods for perennial
crops, and gestation lags for livestock projects. Excess physical
capacity in the manufacturing sector guarantees quicker response, all
other things being equal. While theoretically, investment demand is
expected to respond to profit rates and availability of finance, not
much is known about the statistical investment functions for Jamaica.
One would expect however, regardless of the strength and time structure
of the underlying relationships, that uncertainty about future profits
and the sociopolitical climate would delay the response to current
improvements in profits and financial capacity. The odds are
that growth and supply effects are weak in the shortrun.
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There is a consensus that key marketing features for Jamaica's
merchandise exports, namely transfer pricing for bauxite and alumina,
and quota sales 1n foreign currency for sugar and bananas, imply weak
export demand sensitivities to exchange rate changes. The price
elasticity of demand for exports of manufactured goods is not known,
but is thought to be significant. Demand for tourism is price sensitive
as French's results demonstrate.
Credit effects are fairly predictable. The slower growth of
credit depresses aggregate expenditures, thereby reducing import demand.
A serious adverse side effect is that credit restraint also reduces the
demand for domestic goods thereby tending to weaken profit expectations.
This effect is offset to the extent that there are production-related
expenditures financed out of savings. Much depends on the lag between
these demand contractionary effects and the supply creating effects of
the program. Another possibly adverse side effect is the contraction
of production that might result from any liquidity squeeze on firms.
Jamaican enterprises rely heavily on bank credit for working capital.
Global credit restraint can hurt them. However, this does not seem
to have been a problem. The banks experienced considerable buildup
of liquidity, the ratio of loans to deposits decreasing from .93 in
1975 to .72 in 1977, and .65 in 1978. Moreover, the stabilization
program advocated preferential treatment of production credit within
the general policy of restraint. As a result, the supply of production
credit did not decrease. Instead, credit demand contracted largely as
a result of the quantitative restrictions on imports.
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Much of the controversy in Jamaica pertains to the employment
effects of the target decline in deficit financing. It is important to
realize that the reduction in government deficits need not mean a fall
in the size of the public sector. Governmental growth may occur if
revenues rise. More importantly, the weight of productive expenditures
in total public expenditures can increase. In which case, government
workers can maintain their jobs by producing goods rather than consumption
services. Furthermore, if a contraction of government is accompanied by
an expansion of the private productive sector, no unemployment need
result. This would reqUire relatively frictionless reallocation of
resources. In practice, some friction ensues, with temporarily negative
effects on employment and labor incomes. In any event, there is no
alternative to a reduction in government deficit expenditures and a
shift in government expenditures towards production if stagflationary
tendencies are to be reversed.
Unemployment and lower levels of liVing are the main economic
adjustment costs imposed by the stabilization program. Real incomes
are likely to fall as a consequence of these unemployment effects and
as a result of the devaluation-induced rise in the domestic cost of
living. Both the unemployed and the employed are likely to be hurt;
the former because they depend on the latter for income transfers.
The logic of the program does predict subsequent recovery and growth of
employment and real incomes. However, these gains materialize towards
the end of the program, or even later, i.e. 3 or more years downstream,
whereas the adjustment costs are immediate. Foreign finance was
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intended to smooth the transition period. However~ in the Jamaican
case, the anticipated private foreign capital inflows did not materialize.
Moreover, the removal of barriers to debt payments drained already scarce
international reserves. In the circumstances, program benefits seemed
even more remote. As a result, public resentment mounted against the
program. Political pressure built up agaInst it, culminating in the
rejection of the stabilization program and the breakdown of Jamaica 1s
relationship with the International Monetary Fund.
Conclusion
This paper examined the Jamaican balance of payments crisis and
the IMP stablization program in order to better understand the volatile
and acrimonious relationship between the International Monetary Fund
and its LDC member countries. The crux of disagreements is usually
the diagnosis of the balance of payments problem and the design of
appropriate stabilization policies. It has been shown that in the
Jamaican case~ the IMP's analysis of the payments problem is consistent
with the empirical situation. The identification of poor production
and export performance and the growth retarding and inflationary role
of government as the main reasons for the crisis cannot be faulted.
The associated policy recommendations in terms of improving production
performance~ increasing profits rates and shares in national income,
and reducing government growth and deficit financing have longer term
merit. Nouecbekeee , short-run adjustment costs are likely to be
severe, and the benefits uncertain and distant.
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The time preference of Jamaican society is weighted in favor of
the present. Adjustment costs consequently seem more important than
future benefits. For this reason, the stabilization program is unpopular
with large segments of the society. The Jamaican government's own
political time preference also seems to be weighted in favor of the
present. The perceived short-run political costs outweigh the possible
long-run gains. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Jamaican
government has opted against the IMP stabilization program.
Jamaican society is now embroiled in political controversy over
the adoption or nonadoption of the IMP stabilization program. So far,
the debate has centered on ideological issues and short-run solutions
of debt rescheduling and debt renegotiation. While of some importance,
these matters divert attention from the real decision which the society
has to make, namely that of restructuring resource use and production
incentives so that the economy grows. There can be no lasting solution
to the balance of payments problem unless economic growth is sustained,
nor no meaningful and effective redistribution policies in a situation
of diminishing national product. To express the choice at this juncture
in terms of balance of payments stabilization versus social equity is to
misrepresent the choice situation. Stabilization, growth, and equity
are closely interrelated. The Jamaican experience demonstrates that
social equity is an elusive goal in a declining economy. Painful though
the shortrun may be, economic recovery and growth should become the
central objective of current Jamaican economic policy.
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NOTES
1. Revised version of paper presented to Economic Development Workshop,
University of Notre Dame, May 1980.
2. Contrary to official intentions, government consumption expenditures
have tended to be regressive in practice.
3. For detailed descriptions of the Extended Fund Facility Stabilization
Program, see Government of Jamaica Ministry of Finance Papers
Nos. 10 and 34.
4. For example, Williams (6) estimates a positive and significant
own price elasticity for Jamaican coffee supply.
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